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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
to a neutral of a war vessel of a belligerent, and, therefore, as I
have endeavored to show, illegal. Surely, if the owners of this
vessel could convey to Stead no valid title to her, it will hardly
be pretended that the captain, acting as he always does in such
cases as agent for the owners, could do so. If then the sale of
this vessel to Stead conveyed no title to him, he of course could
transmit no title to the claimants.
Whether the claimants, Renouard and Bode, acted in good
faith in the purchase of this vessel, it is unnecessary to inquire.
That they are respectable merchants of Nassau, that they paid
a valuable consideration for her, and that they had no intention
of employing her for any illegal purposes, are cheerfully admitted.
This is more, however, than can be said with regard to Stead.
There is too much reason to believe that his object in purchasing
the vessel was to employ. her in running the blockade. But
whether this be so or not, it is a matter of no importance, in the
view which I have taken of this case. He had no right to pur-
chase her for any purpose. And as to Renouard and Bode, they
must have known that this had been a war vessel in the service
of the Confederate States, and they ought to have known that
for this reason, she was not a legitimate object of commercial
speculation
The claim is rejected.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
Action-Right to commence.-Where an award, made under submis-
sion by parties plaintiff and defendant to that effect, awards that one
party shall pay to the other a certain sum on one day specified, another
sum on another day specified, and that to secure the payments he shall
give a bond in a penal sum, and the party against whom the award is
made refuses to do any of the things awarded, an action of debt will lie
against him even although the time when both sums of money were
awarded to be paid has not yet arrived. The right of action is perfect
on the party's refusal to give the bond: Bayne vs. Morris.
Agency.-Authority without restriction to an agent to sell, carries with
it authority to warrant: Sckuchardt vs. Aliens.
Arbitrators.-The power of arbitrators is exhausted when they have
once finally determined matters before them. Any second award is void:
Bayne vs. Morris.
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. L of his Reports.
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Case Stated.-The Supreme Court cannot give judgment as on a case
stated, except where facts, and facts only, are stated. If there be ques-
tion as to the competency or effect of evidence, or any rulings of the
court below upon evidence to be examined, the case is not a "case
stated :" Burr vs. The Des loines Co. ; Pomeroy's Lessee vs. Bank of
Indiana.
Evidence-Courts.-Tlhe rules of evidence prescribed by the laws of a
state being rules of, decision for the Federal courts while sitting within
the limits of such state, they must be obeyed even though they violate
the ancient laws of evidence so far as to make the parties to the action
witnesses in their own cause; herein adopting a practice in opposition to
a specific rule by the- Federal court for the circuit: Ryan vs. Bindley.
Contract of Sale.-Where a sale has been so far completed that the
vendee has bought and received the goods, the vendor cannot hold him
to terms not agreed on, by sending him a bill or memorandum of sale,
with such terms set out upon it as that "no claims for deficiencies or
imperfections will be allowed, unless made within seven days from the
receipt of goods :" Schuchardt vs. Allens.
Court and Tury.-Whenever the evidence is not legally sufficient to
warrant a recovery, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury
accordingly. But if there be evidence from which the jury may draw
an inference in the matter, the case ought not to be taken from them. It
is not necessary, in order for the court properly to leave the case with the
jury, that the evidence leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the
plaintiff has no case. If there be evidence proper to be left to the jury,
it should be left; and a remedy for a wrong verdict sought in a motion
for a new trial: Id.
Estoppel in Pais.-Where Congress gives lands to a state for railroad
purposes and for "no other," and the state granting the great bulk of
them to such purposes allows settlements by pre-emption, where improve-
ment and occupancy have been made on the lands prior to the date of
the grant -y Congress, and since continued; a purchaser from the rail-
road company of a part which the state had thus opened to pre-emption
cannot object to the act of the state in having thus appropriated the
part; the railroad company having, by formal acceptance of the bulk of
the land under the same act which opened a fractional part to pre-
emption, itself waived the right to do so. .The United States as donor
not objecting, nobody can object: Baker vs. Gee.
Bridge.-A railway viaduct, if nothing but a structure made so as to
lay iron rails thereon, upon which engines and cars may be moved and
propelled by steam, not to be connected with the shore on either side of
a river, except by a piece of timber under each rail, and in such a man-
ner, as near as may be, so as to make it impossible for man or beast to
cross said river upon said structure, except in railway cars (the only,
roadway between said shore and said structure being two or more iron
rails, two and a quarter inches wide; four and a half inches high, laid
and fastened upon said timber four feet ten inches asunder), is not a
"bridge" within the meaning of the Act of New Jersey, passed A. D.
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1790, by which the state enacted that no persons but certain persons
named should erect any "bridge" over certain rivers for a term of
ninety-nine years: Bridge Proprietors vs. llobokes Co.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States.-Error will
lie from the Supreme Court of the United States to the highest court of
law or equity of a state, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act:
1. Where a statute of the United States is technically in issfie in the
pleadings, or is relied on in them, and is -decided against by rulings
asked for and refused, even though the case may have been disposed
of generally by the court on other grounds: State of .Minnesota vs.
Bachelder.
2. Where a statute of a state creates a contract, and a subsequent
statute is alleged to impair the obligation of that contract, and the
highest court of law or equity in the state construes the first statute in
such a manner as that the second statute does not impair it,'whereby the
second statute remains valid under the Constitution of the United States:
Bridge Proprietors vs. Hfoboken Co.
An appellant, under the 25th section of the Judiciary'Act, from the
highest court of law or equity of a state to the Supreme Court of the
United States, under the provision that "where is drawn in question
the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a statute of the
United States, and the decision is. against the title," right, &c., so set'
up, need not set forth specially the claus6 of the Constitution of the
United States on which he'relies. If the pleadings make a case which
necessarily comes within the provisions of the Constitution, it is enough:
id.
The Supreme Court of the United States has no power to review by
certiordri the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a general
officer of the United States Army commanding a military department;
'Ex parte Vallandigham.
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.'
lecord-Deed-Notice-.Attachment. -The record of a deed in one
town conveying land in such town, is not of itself constructive notice of
the conveyance by the same deed of land, lying in another town: Perrin
vs. Reeds.
But if one sees uch record and reads it, and has such knowledge of
the premises as to know from the description that the land in the other
town was conveyed by the deed so recorded, this constitutes notice of the
conveyance of the land in such other town: Id.
An attaching creditor of real estate with notice, either actual or con-
structive, of the true state of the debtor's title, is bound by such notice,
and stands in no better position than a purchaser with the same notice:
Id.
Statute of Limitations-Acknowledgment.-A debtor was summoned
as the trustee of his creditor.- He denied- any liability to the creditor,
1 From Win. G. Shaw, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 35th Vermont'Reports.
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and intended to appear and defend the trustee action, but, forgetting the
day of trial, was adjudged trustee by default. field, that neither the
rendition of this judgment n6r the payment of it by the debtor, was such
an acknowledgment of the creditor's claim, as would prevent the opera-
tion of the Statute of Limitations: Goodwin vs. Buzzell.
Statements by a debtor, who in the same conversation denies the just-
ness of an account, that, if the other party would swear to it, he would
pay it, and that he did not think the account just, but if it was just he
would pay it, are not such acknowledgments of the debt as will take it
out of the Statute of Limitations: .1d.
Fraudulent Aqreement--Payment.-The payment by a debtor to a
creditor of his debt, before it is due, in order to aid the creditor in his
purpose of preventing his creditors from attaching the debt by means of
the trustee process, is not void as within the statute against fraudulent
conveyances, agreements, &o.; chap. 104, § 23, Comp. State; Gen. Stat.
Chap. 113, Sec. 32 : Fletcher vs. Pillsbury and Trustee.
eparate Property of Married oman.-An agreement made during
coverture between husband and wife, that certain personal property or
funds belonging to him shall become her separate property, will be
enforced in equity, if it is so far carried into effect as to separate the
property or fund from the residue of the husband's estate, and place it
in the name and exclusive control of the wife: Cardell vs. Ryder et al.
Way.-A right of way cannot arise from mere necessity, independent
of any grant or reservation express or implied, as in the case of a former
unity of ownership: Tracy vs. Atherton et al.
Attachment-Actlon- Officer.-The general owner of property at-
tached by his creditors may maintain a suit against the attaching officer
for damage to the property attached through the officer's negligence,
while the suit upon which the property is attached is still pending, and
the attachment is still in force: Briggs vs. Taylor.
The rights of the creditor and officer in such cases may be protected
by an order of court for the stay of execution, or the payment of the
damages into court to await the determination of the original suit in
which the attachment was made: id.
Qui Tam Actions for Fraudulent Conveyances and Jurqrments.-In a
qui tam action against the creditor in a fraudulent judgment, or the
grantee in a fraudulent conveyance, for the statutory penalty, it is neces-
sary that the intent of both parties to the transaction should be ultimately
to defraud creditors. A design to hinder-or delay them merely for a
time is not within the statute: Barnum q. t. vs. Eackett.
But if either party to such mutually fraudulent conveyance or judg-
ment consists of more than one person, those who participate in the
fraudulent intent are not relieved from liability under the statute, by the
fact that all of such persons are not guilty of a criminal design : Id.
